Rational Thinking and Belief in Psychic Abilities: It Depends on Level of Involvement by Stone, A. & Stone, A.
Page 1 
 
Running head: rational thinking and paranormal belief 
 
 
 
 
 
RATIONAL THINKING AND BELIEF IN PSYCHIC ABILITIES:  
IT DEPENDS ON LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT 1 2 
 
 
 
 
 
A. STONE  
University of East London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 address correspondence to Dr A Stone, University of East London, Water Lane, 
Stratford, London, E15 4LZ, United Kingdom or email (a.stone@uel.ac.uk) 
2 The assistance of Mr Daius Stanton with the data collection and initial draft is 
acknowledged with thanks. 
 
 
Page 2 
 
Summary.  Previous research has shown that lay believers in psychic abilities are more 
prone to intuitive thinking, less inclined to rational thinking, and have an external locus of 
control, compared to non-believers. Psychic practitioners, however, may have different 
characteristics. Psychic practitioners (N=31; mean age = 42.7 years, s.d.=13.1), lay believers 
(N=33; mean age = 33.0 years, s.d.=10.3), and non-believers (N=31; mean age = 34.4 years, 
s.d.=15.4) completed questionnaires measuring thinking styles, locus of control, and psychic 
belief. Comparisons of lay believers with non-believers confirmed previous observations; 
believers had a higher propensity for intuitive thinking, lower propensity for rational thinking, 
and more external locus of control. In contrast, practitioners were equivalent to non-believers 
in rational thinking and had the highest internal locus of control. This highlights the 
importance of considering level of involvement with psychic practice in understanding the 
thinking styles of believers. Results suggested that practitioners may have rationalised their 
beliefs and constructed a coherent model of psychic phenomena that satisfies a propensity for 
rational thinking within a community of belief.  
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The psychic abilities of telepathy, precognition, and clairvoyance clearly contradict 
widely-accepted scientific principles. The study of belief in psychic phenomena has tended to 
take a critical view of believers, for example, branding them “irrational, credulous, uncritical 
and foolish” (Alcock, 1981) or “normal people whose normal thinking has gone wrong in 
some way” (Shermer, 1997, p45). Yet this characterisation of believers as lacking in 
rationality may not apply to professional psychics who have completed courses of study at 
psychic colleges, who teach in these colleges, and who have published articles and books. 
Those who have devoted a high degree of commitment to their professional practice might 
also have devoted considerable rational thought to their beliefs. To date there has been little 
research looking into the thinking styles of psychic practitioners as a distinct sub-group of 
believers and the present study aimed to address this topic.   
Rational thinking can be conceived as conscious, verbal, deliberate, analytical, rule-
based, effortful, and independent of affect. In contrast, intuitive-experiential thinking is 
automatic, preconscious, non-verbal, fast, effortless, holistic, and highly associated with 
affect. Tendencies towards these modes of thinking function independently and orthogonally, 
rather than as two ends of a uni-polar scale (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). 
Within this model an intuitive style of thinking is not seen as the result of a lower level of 
cognitive functioning or a series of cognitive shortcuts, but as a self-contained, organised and 
adaptive system. 
It is generally accepted that paranormal beliefs rely on an intuitive style of reasoning 
which values personal experience as the main influence on belief systems (e.g., Murphy & 
Lester, 1976; Brugger & Baumann, 1994; Dudley, 2002;Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005).  
Substantial empirical evidence has linked paranormal belief to a preference for intuitive 
thinking (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 1999; 
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Irwin & Young, 2002; Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; see e.g., French & Stone, 2014, for a 
review).  
On the other hand, a propensity for rational thinking has been linked to lower levels of 
belief in the paranormal (e.g., Alcock & Otis, 1980). For example, Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, 
Koehler, and Fugelsang (2012) proposed that the rational style of thinking promotes the 
detection of contradictions between paranormal abilities and basic scientific principles. They 
suggested that individuals with a propensity to employ an analytic thinking style would show 
a history of questioning and rejecting claims of paranormal phenomena and abilities. In 
accordance with this idea their results showed that the participants who had a greater 
propensity to use an analytic cognitive style had lower levels of paranormal belief, even after 
controlling for cognitive ability. Other researchers have reported similar results of a negative 
association of paranormal belief with preference for the rational thinking style (e.g. Irwin & 
Young, 2002; Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005) though some have observed no association (Epstein 
et al., 1996).  
 A contrasting position was revealed in the study by Wolfradt et al. (1999) which 
explored the pattern of relationships between thinking styles and paranormal belief. The study 
employed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et a.l, 1996) as a measure of 
rational and intuitive thinking styles, as well as the Anomalous Experiences Inventory which 
measures paranormal belief as one of its subscales. A cluster analysis of the results found four 
distinct groups of thinking styles formed by high and low levels of rational and intuitive 
thinking, in accordance with the orthogonal nature of the REI proposed by Epstein et al. 
(1996). The high-rational and low-intuitive group reported the lowest level of anomalous 
experiences and beliefs (as would be expected) but the highest levels of belief were reported 
by participants in the ‘complementary’ group with high-rational and high-intuitive thinking 
styles. This contrasted with the view that paranormal belief is related to a lower degree of 
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rational thinking (e.g. Irwin & Young, 2002; Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Pennycook et al., 
2012).  
A possible resolution to the apparent contradiction was suggested by the observation 
of Wolfradt et al. (1999) that the group with the complementary thinking style (high intuitive 
and high rational) also reported the highest level of self-assessed psychic abilities (effect size 
was not reported). Perhaps a strong belief in one’s own psychic ability demands an exercise of 
rational processes to justify and sustain the belief, and this in turn might create a stronger 
commitment to the belief. If this is the case, then individuals who have invested a great deal 
of commitment in their psychic practice (and therefore, presumably, have a high level of 
belief in their abilities) may also have given considerable conscious deliberation to their 
beliefs.  
The proposition that a preference for rational thinking might be related to commitment 
to psychic practice seems somewhat analogous to the observation by McGarry and Newberry 
(1981) that locus of control was more internal in the group of psychic readers than other 
groups (subscribers to a newsletter, visitors to a psychic fair, and student with no particular 
interest; effect sizes were not given). Further, belief in the paranormal was correlated with 
internal locus of control in individuals with a high level of involvement in psychic practice 
(correlation coefficient of 0.39 in the group of psychic readers), but tended to be associated 
with an external locus of control in individual with a lower degree of involvement (0.13, ns, 
in the group of students). Locus of control describes the source of those factors which are 
perceived to exert the strongest influence on major happenings of personal significance: an 
external locus of control represents the belief that external forces (e.g., fate, luck, or powerful 
people) have the greater influence, whereas an internal locus of control represents the belief 
that events of personal significance are determined by the individuals’ own deeds (e.g. Rotter, 
1975). Typically, belief in psychic phenomena has been theoretically and empirically 
Page 6 
 
associated with external locus of control. For example, Scheidt (1973) proposed that 
precognition/fate would constitute an external force to which the major events in an 
individual’s life could be causally attributed and there is an accumulated body of research that 
links belief in psychic phenomena to external locus of control (e.g., Thalbourne, Dunbar & 
Delin, 1995; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Newby & Davis, 2004).  
The present study contrasted the thinking styles and locus of control of psychic 
practitioners with groups of believers and non-believers in the general population. It was 
predicted that believers would have higher propensity for intuitive thinking, lower rational 
thinking, and more external locus of control, than the non-believers. Psychic practitioners 
would resemble believers with a high propensity for intuitive thinking but would resemble 
non-believers with a high propensity for rational thinking and internal locus of control. 
Rational thinking would be positively related to belief in the group of practitioners, and 
negatively related to belief in the group of non-believers. Intuitive thinking would be 
positively related to belief in the group of practitioners and the group of believers. 
Participants with high levels of intuitive and rational thinking styles were predicted to have 
the highest levels of belief in psychic abilities.  
Method 
Participants 
Psychic practitioners were recruited from three psychic colleges in the UK. They 
comprised 15 men and 16 women, with ages ranging from 19 to 80, mean 42.7 years, s.d. 
=13.1. Practicing psychics were defined as individuals who had written articles on the subject 
of the paranormal, had given at least one hundred psychic readings, and had completed 
advanced training or were teaching in a psychic college (average number of years of study 
was over 5 years). 
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Non-practitioners were recruited via advertisements placed around the University of 
East London and on social media. They comprised 34 men and 30 women. Some (n=5) were 
beginner students at a psychic college, some were students at the University of East London, 
and some were members of the general public, resident in London, UK. Participants with a 
score of 11 or above on the 13-item version of the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale were placed 
in the group of Believers (n=33). They comprised 18 men and 15 women, with ages ranging 
from 22 to 71, mean age = 33.0 years, s.d.=10.3, and they included all of the beginner 
students in a psychic college. Participants with a score 10 or less were placed in the group of 
Non-believers (n=31). They comprised 15 males and 16 females, with ages ranging from 23 
to 84, mean age = 34.4 years, s.d.=15.4. There were no differences among the three groups on 
gender [Pearson chi-square (2) = 0.33, ns]. The practitioners tended to be somewhat older 
than the other groups but there was no difference between believers and non-believers.   
This approach to recruitment was taken in order to recruit believers and non-believers 
from similar populations to avoid the introduction of potential confounding factors. Any 
approach that attempted to deliberately target believers and non-believers would, of necessity, 
have to target different populations. Practitioners were recruited from a separate population 
but this was inevitable given the low level of practitioners who could be found in a random 
sample. Practitioners differed from the small number of lay believers recruited from the 
psychic college on their level of practice; the lay believers had very low levels of practice.   
The sample sizes were decided on the basis of a power calculation with anticipated 
effect size>=0.67, alpha=0.05, power=0.8, which yielded a sample size of 29 participants per 
group. Numbers were roughly balanced in the three groups.   
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Design 
This study employed a non-experimental factorial design. The independent variable 
was the group to which the participants were assigned: one of Practitioner, Believer, or Non-
believer. Gender and age were investigated as other independent variables.  The dependent 
variables were belief in psychic abilities, propensity for rational thinking, propensity for 
intuitive thinking, and Locus of Control.  
Measures 
Participants were asked to complete four measures. The first questionnaire was 
designed to discover participants’ level of psychic practice: estimated number of psychic 
readings given; number of books or articles written; the highest level of psychic training 
courses completed; and status as student or teacher.  
Paranormal belief was measured by the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (Thalbourne & 
Delin, 1993), a well-known and widely-employed measure of belief focusing on those psychic 
abilities that were relevant to the design of the present study. Within parapsychology, 
believers in the paranormal are referred to as “sheep” and sceptics are “goats”. The first 13 
items were used, which indicate a belief in the existence of psychic abilities (e.g., “I believe in 
the existence of ESP” and “I have had at least one premonition about the future that came true 
and which (I believe) was not just a coincidence”) and belief in personal abilities (e.g., “I 
believe I am psychic”). Against these statements participants were asked to circle 0 (false), 1 
(uncertain) or 2 (true). The answers to these questions were summed to give the participant’s 
overall score on this shortened version of the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale.  Five items 
referring to psychokinetic ability, which was not relevant to the study, were omitted from the 
scale to shorten the task for participants. This 13-item version of the Australian Sheep-Goat 
Scale was originally created by Thalbourne (1985). Irwin (1985) reported that it correlated 
0.69 with the total scores on the Paranormal Belief Scale which attested to its convergent 
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validity. According to Thalbourne and Delin (1993) the 13-item version of the Australian 
Sheep-Goat Scale correlated extremely highly with the 18-item version, r=0.97 over 345 
participants. Hence, it appears that the 13-item version and the 18-item version are essentially 
measuring the same construct. Thalbourne and Delin (1993) also noted that Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0.94 for the 18-item version and that there were correlations between 0.19 and 0.72 with 
other measures of paranormal belief. Thalbourne (1998) further reported correlations of 0.54 
with magical ideation and 0.56 with mystical experience.  
Thinking style was measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) of Epstein 
et al. (1996), a self-report measure of individual preferences for rational and experiential-
intuitive thinking styles, consisting of 31 questions in two subscales. The Need for Cognition 
subscale measures the extent to which people enjoy partaking in cognitively taxing activities 
and is an indicator of a rational thinking style. Individuals who score highly on Need for 
Cognition tend to have an inquiring attitude, to enjoy solving complex problems, and to think 
abstractly. The subscale consists of 19 items (e.g., “I prefer complex to simple problems” and 
reverse-scored “Thinking is not my idea of fun”). The Faith in Intuition subscale measures the 
degree to which people trust their feelings and initial intuitions about themselves, others, and 
their environment. It consists of 12 items, none reverse scored (e.g., “I trust my initial feelings 
about people” and “I am a very intuitive person”). Respondents are asked to respond by 
marking a five-point scale from ‘1-Strongly disagree’ to ‘5-strongly agree’. Epstein et al. 
(1996) reported Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87 for the Need for Cognition scale and 0.77 for the 
Faith in Intuition scale. Measures of coping ability and academic performance supported the 
interpretation of the two scales.  
Locus of Control (LOC) was measured using the 20-point scale created by McGarry 
and Newberry (1981). This consisted of the five questions with the highest loadings on each 
of the four factors identified by Collins (1974) in analysis of responses from 300 participants 
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to the 46 options on the original forced-choice Rotter (1966) Internal-external control scale. 
There were 12 items indicating an internal LOC (e.g., “In the long run people get the respect 
they deserve in this world” and “There really is no such thing as luck”) and eight items 
indicating an external LOC (e.g., “Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the 
direction my life is taking” and “Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are 
controlled by accidental happenings”). Participants were asked to mark each item on a 5 point 
scale from ‘1-Strongly disagree’ to ‘5- Strongly agree’.  
Procedure 
Psychic colleges gave permission to send an invitation via email to teachers and 
students advertising that individuals were being sought for a psychological study concerning 
the differences in thinking styles between lay-people and psychic practitioners. The email 
included a link to an online version of the measures. Alternatively, paper versions of the 
measures were made available at the colleges for participants to complete in their own time, 
and to place in a collection box. Other non-practitioners were recruited via advertisements 
placed around the University of East London and on social media and were invited to 
complete the questionnaires either online or in hard copy. Ethical clearance was obtained 
from the University of East London Ethics Committee. Participants were debriefed at the end 
of the study and were given the researcher’s email address in case they had any questions at a 
later date.  
Analysis 
Comparisons of the Need for Cognition, Faith in Intuition, Australian Sheep-Goat 
scores, and Locus of Control, among the participant groups were conducted using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Age was entered as a covariate and participant gender was entered as an 
additional independent variable to examine whether these factors might interact with the 
factor of participant group to influence the dependent variables.  Post-hoc comparisons used t-
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tests with Bonferroni correction to guard against type 1 error. Relationships among the 
dependent variables were investigated with bivariate correlations.  
Results 
Missing data (less than 1%) were replaced by the mean of the appropriate scale or 
subscale. No outliers were found. Normality was deemed at acceptable levels to run 
parametric tests. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance revealed heterogeneity for two of 
the dependent variables: the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale and Need for Cognition. However, 
One-way ANOVA is robust to violations of homogeneity of variance as long as sample sizes 
are approximately equal, as was the case in the present study (Howell, 2007; Dancey & 
Reidy, 2011). Non-parametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis for comparisons among the three groups 
and Mann-Whitney U test for comparisons of pairs of groups) gave a similar pattern of results 
to the parametric tests so only the parametric tests are reported.    
The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale was scored by summing the responses to all items 
with no questions being reverse-scored. A higher score indicated a higher belief in psychic 
phenomena and ability. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.96 and Spearman-Brown’s split-half 
reliability was 0.95. The Rational-Experiential Inventory was scored by calculating the totals 
separately for the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale, with 
designated items on the Need for Cognition subscale being reverse scored. A higher score 
indicated a higher level of Need for Cognition or Faith in Intuition, respectively. Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.85 for the Need for Cognition scale and 0.84 for the Faith in Intuition scale. 
Spearman-Brown’s split-half reliability was 0.85 for the Need for Cognition scale and 0.72 
for the Faith in Intuition scale. Correlations in the whole sample, and in each group 
separately, supported orthogonality of the Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition (please 
refer to Table 2). The Locus of Control questionnaire was scored by calculating the totals 
separately for the external and internal subscales and subtracting the external scores from the 
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internal scores. A higher score indicated a more internal locus of control. Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0.77 and Spearman-Brown’s split-half reliability was 0.59. The scores on all variables 
were similar for the Believers recruited from the Psychic Colleges and those recruited from 
the University of East London and social media, please refer to Table 1.  
Figure 1 presents the means of the measures. A series of one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to compare the scores on Australian Sheep-Goat Scale, Faith in Intuition, Need for 
Cognition, and Locus of Control between the groups of practitioners, believers and non-
believers, with age as a covariate and participant gender as an additional factor. Post-hoc 
comparisons among the groups used the Bonferroni correction to guard against type 1 error. 
All variables differed among the three groups: Australian Sheep-Goat Scale  - F(2,92)=249, 
MSE=13.4, p=0.000; Faith in Intuition  - F(2,92)=13.5, MSE=42.5, p=0.000; Need for 
Cognition  - F(2,92)=8.84, MSE= 83.8, p=0.000; Locus of Control  - F(2,92)=10.64, 
MSE=18.4, p=0.000. Neither participant age nor gender, nor the interaction of gender with 
participant group, was significant in any of the analyses (all F<1.7, p>0.19).  
Figure 1 about here 
Scores on the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale were higher for practitioners than 
believers, and higher for believers than non-believers. Similarly, scores on the Faith in 
Intuition scale were higher for practitioners than believers, and higher for believers than non-
believers. Need for Cognition was equivalent in the practitioners and non-believers and lower 
in the believers. Locus of Control was more internal in the practitioners than in the believers 
(and marginally more internal in the practitioners than in the non-believers, p=0.07, and 
marginally more internal in the non-believers than in the believers, p=0.7). Please refer to 
Figure 1 and Table 1.    
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 Practit-
ioners 
Non-
believers 
Believers Effect size 
Pract  vs. 
Believers 
   Total Psychic 
College 
General 
believers 
 
Australian 
Sheep-
Goat scale 
24.0a (2.0)  3.8c (3.6) 18.0b (4.8) 15.0 (4.4) 18.5 (4.7) 1.76 
Faith in 
Intuition 
49.0a (4.6) 40.4c (7.5) 44.5b (7.0) 45.0 (0.7) 44.4 (7.7) 0.78 
Need for 
Cognition 
74.7a (4.0) 71.2a (8.2) 65.2b(12.5) 67.0 (7.2) 64.9 (13.2) 1.15 
Locus of 
Control 
22.0a (8.0) 17.1 (6.1) 12.2b(10.3) 10.0 (9.2) 12.6 (10.6) 1.07 
Table 1: Mean (and s.d.) of scores on the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale, Faith in 
Intuition, Need for Cognition, and Locus of Control, among the practitioners, believers and 
non-believers. Superscripts denote means that differ significantly. Note that the believers’ 
scores were similar for those recruited from the Psychic Colleges (n=5) and those recruited 
via the University of East London and social media (n=28).  
Scores on the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale were positively correlated with Need for 
Cognition [r(29)=0.52, p=0.003] among the practitioners; negatively correlated with Need for 
Cognition  [r(31)=-0.30, p=0.047] and positively correlated with Faith in Intuition  
[(r(29)=0.40, p=0.026] among the believers; and not correlated with Need for Cognition or 
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Faith in Intuition in the non-believers. Please refer to Table 2. This tends to suggest that the 
rational thinking style was used in different ways by the practitioners and believers.  
 
 Practitioners Believers Non-believers 
 FI NfC LoC FI NfC LoC FI NfC LoC 
ASGS  - 0.08  0.52  - 0.19  0.40  - 0.30  - 0.16  0.26  0.15  0.28 
FI   - 0.19  0.09   - 0.29  - 0.07   - 0.12  0.02 
NfC    0.18    0.52    0.12 
Table 2: Correlations among the dependent variables in the three groups of 
practitioners, believers and non-believers. Statistically significant correlations are in bold. 
ASGS = Australian Sheep-Goats scale; FI = Faith in Intuition; NfC = Need for Cognition; 
LoC = Locus of Control.  
A control group was created from the top-scoring third of the believers (n=11) who 
were matched on their scores on the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale with the practitioners 
[believers: M=23.5, s.d.=1.3; practitioners: M=24.0, s.d.=2.0; t(40)=0.84, ns]. The 
practitioners were higher than this control group on their Need for Cognition [t(40)=2.77, 
p=0.019] and more internal on their Locus of Control [t(38)=3.57, p=0.001] suggesting that 
the differences on these variables did not depend on differences in the reported level of belief, 
but rather on differences in the level of involvement in psychic practice.  
Participants were divided into four groups formed by the quadrants of high versus low 
rational thinking and intuitive thinking (as Epstein et al., 1996). One-way ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference among the four groups in their level of belief in psychic abilities, 
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F(3,91)=14.81, MSE=58.4, p=0.000. The group with the complementary thinking style (high 
intuitive and high rational) had the highest level of belief in psychic abilities: complementary 
group M=23.1, s.d.=5.2; high-intuitive and low-rational group M=19.0, s.d.=6.7; high-rational 
and low-intuitive group M=10.4, s.d.=9.3; and low rational and intuitive M=11.0, s.d.=8.1. 
Planned contrasts confirmed that the complementary group had a higher level of belief than 
all the other groups: compared to high-intuitive and low-rational t(91)=2.25, p=0.030; high-
rational and low-intuitive t(91)=5.7, p=0.000; and low rational and intuitive t(91)=6.2, 
p=0.000.   
Discussion 
Psychic believers had a higher preference for intuitive thinking, lower preference for 
rational thinking, and a marginally more external locus of control, than did the non-believers. 
Their level of belief in psychic abilities was positively correlated with intuitive thinking and 
negatively correlated with rational thinking style. This is all in accordance with previous 
observations in the literature. The practitioner group in some respects resembled an extreme 
type of believer, having the highest belief in psychic abilities and the highest preference for 
intuitive thinking. However, and as predicted, this group scored as high as non-believers on 
rational thinking and had a marginally more internal locus of control than non-believers. 
Propensity for rational thinking in practitioners was correlated with stronger belief in psychic 
abilities, in contrast to the believers for whom preference for rational thinking was associated 
with lower belief in psychic abilities.  
When the entire participant sample was divided into four groups form by the 
quadrants of high vs. low Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition the highest level of belief 
in psychic abilities was found in the Complementary group with high Need for Cognition and 
high Faith in Intuition. This was consistent with the findings of Wolfradt et al. (1999) whose 
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participants with a complementary (high rational, high intuitive) thinking style showed the 
highest level of belief in the paranormal and self-assessed ability.   
Results were consistent with McGarry and Newberry’s findings (1981) that a higher 
level of involvement with psychic practice was associated with internal locus of control. The 
present results contrasted with other studies reporting that high levels of belief are associated 
with low levels of rational thinking and with external locus of control. A plausible 
explanation for the discrepancy is that these other studies did not recruit participants with a 
high degree of involvement in psychic practice or a high degree of self-assessed ability.  
The observation of a positive association between rational thinking and belief in 
psychic abilities in the group of practitioners may be due to two possibilities: a higher level of 
belief demands more rationalising to sustain the belief, or alternatively, more exercise of 
rational thinking leads to an increased in belief. The latter might seem inconsistent with the 
notion that a propensity for rational thinking would normally be expected to facilitate the 
detection of contradictions between psychic beliefs and scientific principles (e.g., Pennycook 
et al., 2012). Sustaining a high level of belief requires that practitioners are able to reconcile 
the contradictions they are likely to have observed, so it is interesting to consider how such 
reconciliation might be achieved.  
One solution might be to require that belief in psychic ability should be integrated in a 
coherent structure with other related beliefs, but not necessarily integrated with a wider range 
of scientific laws (e.g. French & Stone, 2014, Chapter 2). Psychic colleges typically offer 
structured courses with classes, assessments, certificates for successful completion, qualified 
lecturers with membership of professional bodies, and a literature database. It seems likely 
that a student at a psychic college would be encouraged to exercise rational thought within 
areas constrained by the syllabus. Students may find that such reasoning supports belief in an 
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environment which is relatively closed to mainstream scientific influence so that 
contradictory ideas are not fully explored. Belief in psychic abilities is a major motivation and 
requirement for membership of a psychic college, and conformity to the dominant set of 
beliefs in any group is typically rewarded. Hence, it is likely that students would be 
encouraged to exercise their propensity for rational thought within bounds that comply with 
the underlying tenets of the college. For individuals involved in psychic practice, there are 
systematic processes in a one-to-one interaction, for example, the norm to be polite on the 
part of the client, that could lead to positive feedback for the psychic and thus help to sustain 
their belief in their own abilities (e.g., Rowland, 2002). 
Sperber (1990) considered the processes involved in the acquisition of different types 
of belief. In Sperber’s model, intuitive belief is formed spontaneously as a result of 
unconscious inference about the world. An individual with a high-intuitive thinking style will 
often form a belief automatically on the basis of intuition (Petty, Brinol, Loersch, & 
McCaslin, 2009). In contrast, reflective belief is one which is subject to an intentional process 
of explicit validation, including examining the evidence and listening to the relevant 
authorities. Reflective belief may be formed initially as an intuitive belief but is later justified 
by deliberate processes of reason and consideration of evidence. Combining these two styles, 
an individual with a high-intuitive and high-rational thinking style is likely to form beliefs 
influenced by intuition and then to also elaborate and reflect on their beliefs (Petty et al., 
2009). In the environment of a psychic college, this elaboration and reflection, guided by 
authorities of the college, is likely to sustain the original intuitive belief.  
Another common solution to the apparent contradictions between scientific principles 
and psychic belief could be to take the view that psychic abilities are simply not properly 
understood by science and that they may not, in fact, contradict the principles of science when 
appropriate knowledge becomes available. Mussell (2010) noted that the need for cognition is 
Page 18 
 
closely related to epistemic curiosity, defined as a desire for knowledge and to eliminate 
information gaps, and McGarry and Newberry (1981) noted that many individuals in their 
sample favoured a scientific analysis of paranormal phenomena. So a person who believes 
s/he has a psychic gift and who also has high need for cognition might be motivated to study 
at a psychic college to try to understand her/his gift. Indeed, the website of the Institute of 
Psychic Practitioners explains that their course for psychics and mediums “goes further by 
explaining an understandable foundation for the psychic paranormal effects associated with 
spirit communication at séances”.1 
Although belief in psychic phenomena may be irrational in a scientific sense, 
involvement in psychic practice may be quite rational in the sense that it provides social and 
economic benefits as well as status and professional standing. A similar argument was 
advanced by McGarry and Newberry (1981) to explain why internal locus of control should 
be higher in practitioners than in lay believers. It is not suggested that the practitioners were 
engaged in their practice primarily for financial reasons; rather that the various benefits of 
professional practice could provide an additional motivation to sustain high levels of belief. In 
this sense the practitioners might resemble members of any of the caring professions in being 
motivated by a desire to achieve a social status and to earn a living as well as to help others.  
The present findings indicated factors that would tend to make a psychic practitioner 
particularly resistant to persuasion to abandon her/his belief. The practitioner is likely to have 
given serious consideration to building a coherent theoretical structure to sustain his/her 
belief. It will not be easily assailed by simply pointing to the contradictory evidence from 
                                            
1 Institute of Psychic Practitioners. Retrieved 26th February (2014) from 
http://www.parapsych.org.uk/html/psychic.html  
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controlled experimental studies, as selective attention to evidence and partial evaluation of the 
quality of argument can enable a belief to be sustained even in the face of strong contrary 
evidence (e.g. French & Stone, 2014, Chapter 6). If psychic colleges were to open themselves 
up to mainstream science this could make a difference, however, psychic practitioners have 
their own conceptual understanding, drawing on scientific concepts, of their abilities, so a 
sophisticated scientific argument would be required. It also seems likely that the social and 
economic benefits conferred by psychic practice would not be easy for anyone to give up. 
Education in schools, colleges and universities should build an appreciation of the scientific 
method that would promote rational appraisal of the claims of psychic practitioners. This 
might lead in time to a reduction in levels of belief prevalent within society.  
Certain limitations of this research should be noted. A limited number of psychic 
colleges were approached, and while there is no reason to suppose that results would have 
been any different in another sample, this should be noted. The psychic practitioners were all 
engaged in some form of psychic consultancy in which they would meet one-to-one with a 
client to offer guidance and advice (e.g., astrologers, tarot card readers, mediums, 
clairvoyants, palm-readers, etc). Practitioners involved in other types of practice (e.g., 
dowsing) might show a different pattern of results. Because of the different recruitment 
methods used to gain a sample of psychic practitioners compared to believers and non-
believers there may have been other, unintended differences among the samples. This was 
unavoidable given the low level of psychic practitioners in the general population that 
rendered a focused recruitment necessary but nonetheless this should be taken into account.  
Believers and non-believers were recruited heavily from a student population at the 
University of East London and so may have had higher levels of education than the general 
population. This could impact on their Internal Locus of Control and Need for Cognition so as 
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to inflate these scores relative to the general population. A different sample might yield 
stronger contrasts on these measures between the Practitioners and other groups.  
The present study focused on thinking style rather than on critical thinking ability. A 
review of the literature (e.g., French & Stone, 2014, Chapter 6) suggested a weak consensus 
linking paranormal believers to lower levels of ability in some types of critical thinking but it 
was not clear how the deficit should be characterised. The lack of consistency in the literature 
hampered the identification of a specific underlying type of critical thinking and hence this 
was not considered to be suitable variable for investigation. The present study therefore 
focused on thinking style on which there is a clearer consensus. A further limitation which 
should be noted is that it is not possible to determine whether reported differences in thinking 
styles are the product of actual differences or of differences in the value placed on rational 
and intuitive thinking styles. Along similar lines, the psychic practitioners may have felt 
under particular pressure to appear rational and thus to inflate their propensity for rational 
thinking, though it is generally true that participants prefer to appear rational and this pressure 
could have applied also to lay believers and non-believers.  
The possibility must be acknowledged that the non-believers may have had higher 
levels of education than the believers, which could explain their higher Need for Cognition 
and more internal Locus of Control. However, the review by French and Stone (2014) was 
inconclusive as to whether belief is related to educational level with several reports that those 
with a higher level of education have stronger belief in anomalous mental powers. Future 
studies could measure educational level to see if this might explain differences between 
believers and non-believers. It should also be acknowledged that any form of education, not 
only in a Psychic College, would result in a higher Need for Cognition.  
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This study suggests that there is no simple relationship between the propensity for 
rational thinking and belief in psychic abilities without taking into account the level of 
involvement in psychic practice.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: means of the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale, Faith in Intuition, Need for 
Cognition, and locus of control, among the practitioners, believers and non-believers. The 
Need for Cognition scale is adjusted by subtracting 30 from each participant score in order to 
fit onto the common scale. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.    
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